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TO WITHDRAW OR NOT TO WITHDRAW:
REVIEWABILITY OF AN AGENCY’S WITHDRAWN
PROPOSED RULE

Jane E. Carmody*
Abstract: Federal agencies propose thousands of regulations in any given year. The
Administrative Procedure Act requires such agencies to follow certain procedures when
enacting rules and regulations. However, when an agency proposes a new rule that is purely
discretionary—not mandated by Congress—it may withdraw the proposed rule at any point
before the rule is finalized. In October 2017, the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid (CMS)
withdrew a proposed rule that, if enacted, would have required long-term care facilities to
recognize out of state same-sex marriages as a condition of Medicare and Medicaid
participation. In its formal withdrawal published in the Federal Register, CMS reasoned that
the proposed rule was no longer necessary due to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges.
This Comment examines the circumstances under which a district court can review an
agency’s withdrawal of a discretionary proposed rule. For nearly forty years, the D.C. Circuit
has held that withdrawn discretionary rules may be ripe for judicial review if two requirements
are met: (1) the withdrawal signals final agency action and (2) the agency created an adequate
and precise record pursuant to informal notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, some
commentators, notably former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, argue that an agency’s
decision to withdraw a proposed rule is wholly discretionary and thus unreviewable in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heckler v. Chaney.
This Comment concludes by arguing that judicial review of withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules is necessary to prevent arbitrary and capricious agency action. Moreover,
despite Judge Kozinski’s concerns, arbitrary and capricious review supplies a reviewing court
with the critical tools to review withdrawn discretionary rules.

INTRODUCTION
In 2013, not all states allowed same-sex couples to marry. Later that
year, however, the fight for marriage equality gained a historic victory. In
United States v. Windsor,1 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as unconstitutional.2 Under section 3
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to thank
Professor Sanne Knudsen for her insightful comments and guidance throughout the drafting process.
I would also like to thank the exceptional Washington Law Review editors whose edits and thoughtful
comments helped me improve this piece. Any errors are my own.
1. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
2. Id. at 774–75.
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of DOMA, the federal government actively defined marriage as “a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”3 The Court
held that this provision violated the Fifth Amendment’s promise of Due
Process.4 Thus, the federal government could no longer determine the
validity of a couple’s marriage based upon the sex of the spouses. The
holding of Windsor, however, did not prevent states from banning samesex marriages.5
On December 12, 2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
(CMS),6 published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register.7 The proposed rule, an action of the Obama Administration,
sought to ensure that skilled nursing facilities, also referred to as longterm care facilities, complied with the holding in Windsor.8 Long-term
care facilities provide “skilled nursing care and related services for
residents who require medical or nursing care, or rehabilitation services
for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick persons.”9 CMS requires
long-term care facilities to comply with conditions of participation in
order to receive Medicare and Medicaid funding.10
In light of the Windsor decision, the Obama Administration’s proposed
CMS rule sought to add additional requirements for participation in the
federal Medicare program. These requirements ensured “equal treatment
to spouses, regardless of their sex.”11 This included recognizing the
marriages of same-sex couples even if the state in which the facility was
located did not allow same-sex couples to marry.12 At the time, the
3. Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996); see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) invalidated
by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 751.
4. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 774–76; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
5. See Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/
[https://perma.cc/9E93G5XH].
6. CMS is the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) responsible
for administering U.S. healthcare programs. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/About-CMS.html [https://perma.cc/NQV9-9AFX].
7. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,873 (proposed Dec. 12, 2014) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 416, 418, 482, 483, and 485).
8. Id.; Windsor, 570 U.S. at 772 (finding that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of
state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,” thus violating the Fifth Amendment).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
10. 42 C.F.R. § 483.1(a)–(b) (2018).
11. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 73,874.
12. Id.
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Medicare participation requirements deferred to state law regarding the
definition of marriage.13 The proposed rule would have ensured that
same-sex spouses were “recognized and afforded equal rights in certain
Medicare and Medicaid-participating facilities.”14 Under the proposed
rule, facilities could no longer defer to state law regarding marriage and
receive federal support.15
The proposed CMS rule, however, never took effect.16 On October 4,
2017, after the change in presidential administration, CMS formally
withdrew the proposed rule.17 The agency cited one reason for the
withdrawal—the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision Obergefell v.
Hodges.18
In Obergefell, the Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected a person’s fundamental right to marriage.19 The majority in
Obergefell held that states could no longer prohibit same-sex couples from
getting married—effectively legalizing same-sex marriage in all fifty
states.20 Because of this ruling, CMS reasoned that Obergefell “requires a
state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex, and to
recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other States.”21 CMS
therefore, withdrew the proposed rule because Obergefell “addresse[s]
many of the concerns raised in the December 2014 proposed rule.”22 Thus,
CMS believed the proposed rule was redundant.
The withdrawal of the proposed CMS rule by the Trump
Administration is not unconventional. New presidential administrations
often clean house of unwanted regulatory structures.23 Withdrawn
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,181 (withdrawn Oct. 4,
2017).
17. Id.
18. Id.; 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
19. 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03.
20. Id. at 2604–05.
21. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. at 46,181.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
4435
(Jan.
26,
2009),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-1639.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2MWX-VCTQ] (On January 20, 2009, the Obama Administration sent a
memorandum ordering department heads to “[w]ithdraw from the OFR all proposed or final
regulations that have not been published in the Federal Register so that they can be reviewed and
approved by a department or agency head.”); Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of

16 - Carmody (Do Not Delete)

2110

12/28/2018 4:31 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:2107

proposed rules, however, highlight a unique area of administrative law.
Should courts be able to review agency actions that are wholly
discretionary? If yes, then under what standard? How much deference
should be given to agencies for deciding to withdrawal a proposed rule?
When an agency engages in rulemaking, several legal mechanisms
within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) operate to ensure sound
agency decision-making. For example, the APA requires an agency to:
(1) support its findings with factual evidence;24 (2) act within its relevant
constitutional and statutory authority;25 and (3) act in a manner that is not
“arbitrary” or “capricious.”26 The APA also provides several judicial
review provisions that enable courts to review agency decision-making.27
For example, not every agency decision is judicially reviewable—the
APA only allows courts to review “final agency action.”28 This includes
both affirmative action by an agency and also an agency’s “failure to
act.”29 Because of this requirement, courts cannot review agency decisions
that are “committed to agency discretion by law.”30
Withdrawn discretionary proposed rules, however, do not easily fit into
the categories of agency action or inaction, and the U.S. Supreme Court
has yet to weigh in on the appropriate categorization for these actions
under the APA. Thus, even though CMS invested significant time and
resources into the proposed rule, there is a possibility that the action of
withdrawing the proposed rule is not judicially reviewable under the APA.
Without judicial review, an agency could pull the plug on a proposed
rule’s progress with little to no accountability.31
This Comment uses the Obama Administration’s proposed CMS rule
and the Trump Administration’s subsequent withdrawal to discuss the
reviewability of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules. Focusing on the
withdrawn proposed CMS rule as a case study, this Comment argues that
Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-01-24/pdf/01-2368.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5S3A-VGKR]
(On January 20, 2001, the Bush Administration sent a similar memorandum to department heads that
they should “send no proposed or final regulation to the Office of the Federal Register (the ‘OFR’)
unless and until a department or agency head appointed by the President after noon on January 20,
2001, reviews and approves the regulatory action”).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
25. Id. § 706(2)(B)–(C).
26. Id. § 706(2)(A).
27. Id. §§ 701–06; see Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 464 (2008).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
29. Id. § 551(13).
30. Id. § 701(a).
31. See id. § 553.

17 - Carmody.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

12/28/2018 4:31 PM

REVIEWING WITHDRAWN PROPOSED RULES

2111

judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules is both
appropriate and necessary to prevent agency abuse of power.
Furthermore, judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules
forces agencies to engage in non-arbitrary decision-making.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the
administrative rulemaking process and how withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules fit into the APA’s framework. It then outlines the APA’s
judicial review provisions and the requirements to challenge agency
action. Part II describes the regulatory history of the Obama
Administration’s discretionary proposed rule. It then discusses the
particulars of the proposed CMS rule and the added protections the rule
would have given LGBT older adults. Furthermore, Part II describes the
protections, if any, Obergefell provides to LGBT older adults. Part III
sketches the progression of judicial review of withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules and the lens through which courts review the agency’s
reasoning behind such withdrawals. It then outlines both the prevailing
view of the D.C. Circuit and Judge Kozinski’s dissenting viewpoint on
judicial review. Lastly, Part IV argues that review of withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules is an appropriate exercise of judicial power
under the APA to ensure non-arbitrary agency decision-making.
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING AND WITHDRAWN
RULES

Through rulemaking, federal agencies have an immense impact on a
wide array of national policies.32 The rulemaking process generally begins
with an act of Congress granting rulemaking authority to an agency, which
allows the agency to then implement rules to effectuate the purpose and
goals of the statute.33 On average, federal agencies “issue more than 3,000
final rules each year” on a variety of topics.34 In comparison, the 115th
Congress passed just ninety-seven laws—including seventy-four bills and
twenty-three joint-resolutions.35
32. Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May 24, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-government
/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html?utm_term=.ac47aaff72db
[https://perma.cc/G9TY-JZ5R].
33. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS:
AN OVERVIEW 1 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32240.pdf [https://perma.cc/25ML-GDJ5].
34. Id.
35. Danny Vink, What Congress Actually Did in 2017, POLITICO (Dec. 26, 2017, 3:06 PM),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/12/26/congresss-secret-achievements-000604
[https://perma.cc/4YNY-RX38].
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Despite this vast and expanding power, courts are constrained in
reviewing some agency actions under the APA.36 Withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules, like the proposed CMS rule, occupy a
unique space within administrative law. Withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules do not necessarily represent agency action or inaction—
raising the question of whether judicial review is proper.37 Furthermore,
the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on whether withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules are judicially reviewable.38 The D.C. Circuit,
however, has ruled in the affirmative, holding that withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules are in fact subject to judicial review.39
This Part discusses the mechanics and history of the reviewability of
withdrawn discretionary proposed rules. It begins by summarizing the
administrative rulemaking process. Next it explores the various hurdles in
challenging this type of discretionary agency action. Finally, this Part
surveys the D.C. Circuit’s application of the arbitrary and capricious
review standard to an agency’s reasoning for withdrawing proposed rules.
A.

The APA Sets Forth Requirements for the Rulemaking Process

Before a rule is proposed, withdrawn, finalized, or even challenged, an
agency must comply with certain formalities.40 Virtually all agency
rulemaking goes through the informal rulemaking process, as opposed to

36. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV.
689, 693–702 (1990) (“The APA’s judicial review chapter provides that agency action is normally
subject to review, but also states in section 701(a) that the chapter ‘does not apply to the extent that
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’
The first of the two numbered clauses does not create interpretation difficulties (although there may
be uncertainty as to whether a given statute actually precludes review). The cryptic language of the
second clause, however, has generated tremendous confusion.”).
37. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency
in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1188 (2009).
38. Id. at 1190.
39. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[I]n light of
the strong presumption of reviewability, discretionary decisions not to adopt rules are reviewable
where, as here, the agency has in fact held a rulemaking proceeding and compiled a record narrowly
focused on the particular rules suggested but not adopted.”). Some scholars note that the D.C. Circuit
is “the second most important court” in the United States because of its unique position in reviewing
the bulk of agency actions. Aaron Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review – Reviewed: The Second Most
Important Court?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 4, 2015), http://yalejreg.com/nc/dc-circuit-review-reviewed-the-second-most-important-court-by-aaron-nielson/
[https://perma.cc/PPH7-AP2Y].
40. Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
856, 856 (2007).
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formal rulemaking.41 When an agency engages in informal rulemaking it
must comply with the requirements of section 553 of the APA.42 Even
though this section of the APA does not define rulemaking, it imposes
three constraints on agencies seeking to adopt a final rule.43 First, a
“[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making [must] be published in the
Federal Register.”44 The notice of proposed rulemaking only needs to
include “the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved.”45 Next, the agency must allow for an
open comment period so that the general public has “an opportunity to
participate in the rule making” process.46 This can be by “written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”47
Lastly, the agency “shall incorporate” a “concise general statement of [the
rule’s] basis and purpose.”48 This overall framework is often referred to
as “notice-and-comment” rulemaking and only applies to legislative
rules.49 Legislative rules “create rights, impose obligations, or effect
change in existing law pursuant to authority delegated by Congress.”50
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is not needed for “interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure,
or practice.”51
Once the public has had an opportunity to comment, an agency can
move forward in finalizing the rule or issuing a new or modified version
for additional notice-and-comment consideration.52 At this stage, an
agency may also decide to abandon the proposed rule, as CMS did with

41. Id.; see United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236–38 (1973) (holding that formal
rulemaking is only required if the organic act states that rulemaking must take place “on the record”).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
43. Id. These three requirements do not apply to “interpretive rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” Id. Those types of agency rules are beyond
the scope of this Comment.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
45. Id. § 553(b)(3).
46. Id. § 553(c).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 40, at 856 (citations omitted).
50. L.A. Closeout, Inc. v. DHS, 513 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Hemp Indus. Ass’n v.
DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003)); see 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
52. ERULEMAKING
PROGRAM
MGMT.
OFFICE,
EPA,
REGULATORY
TIMELINE,
https://www.regulations.gov/docs/FactSheet_Regulatory_Timeline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6NQ9KNS].
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the 2014 proposed rule.53 Regardless of whether an agency decides to
formally adopt a proposed rule or withdraw a proposed rule, it must
explain why it is taking such action.54
B.

A Reviewing Court Must Comply with the APA’s Limitations on
Judicial Review

The APA specifies the appropriate standard of review for an agency’s
decision to act or not to act.55 Under the APA, an agency’s action must be
“final” before a reviewing court can assess the agency’s reasoning.56 A
two-part test determines when an agency action is “final.”57 First, the
action must symbolize the end of the agency’s decision-making process.58
Second, the action must be one in which “rights and obligations” have
been determined or from which “legal consequences flow.”59 For
example, when an agency engages in notice-and-comment rulemaking
and ultimately promulgates a rule subject to the procedures of section 553
of the APA, it constitutes final agency action, which is subject to judicial
review.60
Even though the final promulgation of a rule easily satisfies the
two-part finality test, agency inaction may also—in limited situations—
satisfy the finality requirement.61 In the case of inaction, an agency has
not started the rulemaking process and the status quo remains
unchanged.62 Thus, a proper challenge to agency inaction is allowed only
under exceedingly narrow circumstances. For example, a court may
review agency inaction if an agency is “compelled by law to act within a
certain time period, but the manner of its action is left to the agency’s

53. Envtl. Integrity Project v. McCarthy, 139 F. Supp. 3d 25, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
54. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 40, at 880 (explaining that after the comment period, the
agency must “articulate explicitly all of the key issues of fact, law, and policy raised” during the
notice-and-comment period).
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (governing judicial review of agency actions in the absence of a governing
statute’s specific reviewing structure).
56. Id. § 704; Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796–97 (1992).
57. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
61. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1187–88.
62. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (holding that failure to act by an
agency “is simply the omission of an action without formally rejecting a request—for example, the
failure to promulgate a rule or take some decision by a statutory deadline”).

17 - Carmody.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

REVIEWING WITHDRAWN PROPOSED RULES

12/28/2018 4:31 PM

2115

discretion” and the agency fails to act.63 In this situation, a court could
“compel” the agency to act because its inaction was “unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed.”64 Therefore, withdrawn rules could be
categorized as final agency action, but that is not always the case.65
The text of the APA excludes judicial review in two instances.66 First,
if the agency’s governing statute explicitly “precludes judicial review,”
then courts are prohibited from reviewing the agency’s action.67 Second,
the APA prohibits courts from reviewing an agency action if the action
“is committed to agency discretion by law.”68 Despite this bright line
designation, the U.S. Supreme Court has nevertheless indicated that
Congressional intent surrounding the judicial review provisions of the
APA indicate that they “must be given ‘hospitable’ interpretation.”69 The
Court further stated that “[t]he legislative material elucidating that
seminal act manifests a congressional intention that it cover a broad
spectrum of administrative actions.”70 Congressional legislative history
also indicates that the APA should apply to a broad range of agency
action:
To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific
in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and
convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure
to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no
evidence of intent to withhold review.71

63. Id. at 65.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
65. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1194.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
67. Id.; see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), abrogated on other grounds,
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’
of a contrary legislative intent should courts restrict access to judicial review.” (quoting Rusk v. Cort,
369 U.S. 367 (1962))).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see Berry v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 832 F.3d 627, 634 (6th Cir. 2016) (“The
phrase ‘committed to agency discretion by law’ is a term of art in administrative law, representing ‘a
very narrow exception’ to judicial review for two particular types of discretionary agency action.”
(quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971))).
69. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140–41; see, e.g., Duncan v. Muzyn, 833 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir.
2016) (“Reviewability is the norm. Courts strongly presume the reviewability of agency action.”);
Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 718 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In general, there is a ‘strong
presumption that Congress intends judicial review of agency action.’” (quoting Helgeson v. Bureau
of Indian Affairs, 153 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1988))).
70. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140.
71. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 275 (1946).
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Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed Rules Fall in the Middle of the
Rulemaking Process

Withdrawn proposed rules exist in a space between final agency action
and agency inaction.72 A withdrawn proposed rule represents an agency’s
decision to begin the rulemaking process, but it also represents an
incomplete rulemaking process.73 Generally, withdrawn rules can be
divided into three broad categories.74 The first two categories are
judicially reviewable.75 First, some statutes explicitly address agency
decisions to withdraw a proposed rule.76 For example, several
environmental statues, such as the Endangered Species Act,77 account for
this type of agency action. Under the Endangered Species Act, when the
agency seeks to list a particular species, pursuant to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, it has three options: (1) conclude within one year that the
species is endangered and then list the species, (2) conclude that the
particular species is not endangered and withdraw the listing, and
(3) extend the potential listing by six months if there is scientific
disagreement about the potential endangerment.78 However, if the agency
ultimately decides to withdraw the listing because the species is not
endangered, that action can be challenged.79 Most statutes, however, “do
not explicitly contemplate the abandonment of proposed rulemakings.”80
Second, “even if the statutory scheme does not explicitly contemplate” an
agency withdrawal, “courts will often review agency decisions to abandon
proposed action if the applicable statute imposes mandatory obligations
on the agency to act.”81 Third, if Congress delegated rulemaking authority
to an agency without delineating specific action, an agency has the

72. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1188.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1188–89.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1188.
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6) (2012). The Clean Air Act is another example of when a statutory
scheme explicitly contemplates a withdrawn proposed rule. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2)–(3) (2012).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6).
79. See, e.g., Tucson Herpetological Soc. v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2009) (Plaintiffs
“contend that the Secretary of the Interior’s (the ‘Secretary’) decision to withdraw a rule proposing
that the flat-tailed horned lizard (the ‘lizard’) be listed as a threatened species is contrary to the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act”); Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741
(W.D. Tex. 1997) (challenging the Secretary of the Interior’s “decision to withdraw the proposed
listing of the Barton Springs salamander (Eurycea sosorum)”).
80. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1189.
81. Id.
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discretion to propose and withdraw rules to effectuate the intent of
Congress.82 Less consensus exists around the reviewability of the third
category of withdrawn rules because these actions represent wholly
discretionary agency decision-making and the U.S. Supreme Court has yet
to weigh in.
II.

THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE 2014 CMS
WITHDRAWN DISCRETIONARY PROPOSED RULE

This Part explores CMS’s 2014 proposed rule and its subsequent
formal withdrawal in the Federal Register. In doing so, this Part highlights
what protections the rule would have provided the growing population of
LGBT older adults in long-term care facilities. Over the next fifteen years,
the nation’s senior population is expected to grow at an unprecedented
rate.83 As this segment of the population continues to increase, the reliance
on long-term care facilities will also rise because many older adults do not
have the necessary savings to continue to live independently or pay for an
in-home nursing aide.84
All adults, especially LGBT older adults, need spaces that are
conducive to aging successfully.85 However, affordable housing for older
adults is lacking overall, let alone LGBT-inclusive housing.86 Current
LGBT older adults need inclusive spaces that embrace their identity
because of the systemic and historical discrimination against those
individuals over the last several decades.87 Without federal protections for
LGBT people in long-term care facilities, LGBT older adults often face
discrimination in those settings.88
82. See generally OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DE4-E2DL].
83. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., HEALTHY AGING BEGINS AT HOME 7 (2016),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/BPC-Healthy-Aging.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JG9-526R].
84. Id. Medicare Part A covers skilled nursing care facilities, including meals, a shared room,
medications, physical therapy, and other services. See Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) Care, U.S.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/skilled-nursingfacility-care.html [https://perma.cc/E4UH-HADE].
85. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & SAGE, UNDERSTANDING ISSUES FACING LGBT
OLDER ADULTS 7 (2017), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/understanding-issues-facing-lgbt-olderadults.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WNS-B95J].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Although the topic is largely outside the scope of this Comment, the Nursing Home Reform
Act and relevant regulations provide standardized requirements that “an institution must meet in order
to qualify to participate as skilled nursing facility in the Medicare program, and as a nursing facility
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The Proposed CMS Rule Would Have Codified Certain Rights for
LGBT Couples in Long-Term Care Facilities

In 2014, CMS proposed a rule that would have altered certain Medicare
participation requirements, also known as “conditions of participation,”
for long-term care facilities that receive federal funding.89 CMS officially
published the proposed rule in the Federal Register on December 12,
2014.90 Prior to the proposed rule, Medicare and Medicaid requirements
for patient’s rights provisions deferred to state law regarding the definition
of marriage.91
CMS stated that the purpose of the proposed rule was “to ensure that
same-sex spouses . . . are recognized and afforded equal rights in
Medicare and Medicaid participating facilities.”92 The proposed rule
would have required long-term care facilities to conform to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s holding in Windsor.93 When the Court decided Windsor,
same-sex marriage was illegal in the majority of states, and more than
70% of states either had constitutional or statutory bans on same-sex
marriage.94 Furthermore, under DOMA, the federal government also
defined marriage as a “union between one man and one woman.”95
After the Windsor ruling that DOMA was unconstitutional, the federal
government could no longer discriminate against legally performed samesex marriages.96 However, the Court did not rule on the legality of state
in the Medicaid program.” 42 C.F.R. § 483.1(b) (2018). The regulations also state that each facility
“must treat each resident with respect and dignity.” Id. § 483.10(a)(1). However, the Act does not
make it illegal to discriminate against residents based on their sexual orientation. Furthermore, the
federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012). The FHA does not expressly
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Individual states, however, may provide
protections that the federal government does not provide.
89. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,873 (proposed Dec. 12, 2014) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 416, 418, 482, 483, and 485).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 73,874.
92. Id. at 73,873.
93. Id.; see United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 771–72 (2013). Under DOMA, plaintiff Edith
Windsor could not claim a federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses after her wife passed
away. The IRS denied her claim because the exemption did not apply to same-sex marriages.
However, in a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy held that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset
of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,” thus violating the Fifth Amendment. Id. at
772.
94. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, supra note 5 (scroll to year 2013 on the United States map).
95. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 570 U.S. 744.
96. 570 U.S. at 772.
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laws banning same-sex marriage. Therefore, CMS’s proposed rule would
have required Medicare and Medicaid participating long-term care
facilities to recognize out of state same-sex marriages, even if the
facility’s state law made them illegal.97 At the time, only seventeen states
had legalized same-sex marriage.98 Without federal recognition,
long-term care facilities located in states that did not recognize same-sex
marriage could disregard a resident’s marriage, even if it was legally
performed in another state.99 For example, under federal long-term care
facility regulations, a resident has the right to appoint a representative who
has decision-making power for the resident in the event of decisional
incapacity.100 The proposed rule would have added language that
established “a requirement that, the same-sex spouse of a resident must be
afforded treatment equal to that afforded to an opposite-sex spouse if the
marriage was valid in the jurisdiction in which it was celebrated.”101
However, the proposed rule never took effect, even though CMS began
informal notice-and-comment rulemaking.102 Following the initial
publication of the proposed rule, the U.S. Supreme Court decided another
landmark same-sex marriage case, Obergefell v. Hodges.103 In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that state same-sex marriage bans violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.104
As a result of this ruling, all fifty states must allow same-sex couples to
obtain marriage licenses—effectively legalizing same-sex marriage
throughout the country.105 On October 4, 2017, CMS withdrew the
proposed rule by publishing a formal notice of withdrawal in the Federal
Register.106 In the notice, CMS cited only one reason for the agency’s

97. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,873 (proposed Dec. 12, 2014) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 416, 418, 482, 483, and 485).
98. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, supra note 5.
99. Medicare and Medicaid Program; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions of
Participation and Conditions for Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 73,874.
100. Id. at 73,875.
101. Id.
102. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,181 (withdrawn Oct. 4,
2017).
103. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
104. Id. at 2604–05; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105. Same-Sex Marriage, State by State, supra note 5.
106. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. at 46,181.
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decision to withdrawal the proposed rule, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Obergefell.107
Considering Obergefell’s impact on the proposed rule, CMS reasoned
that the landmark decision “addressed many of the concerns raised in the
December 2014 proposed rule.”108 CMS stated that “the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of
the same-sex, and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed in
other States.”109 Thus, the proposed rule was no longer needed because
Obergefell accomplished the same goal.
B.

The Obergefell Ruling Does Not Provide LGBT Older Adults
Added Protection Beyond Marriage Recognition

In January 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to a group
of cases from the Sixth Circuit that upheld the same-sex marriage bans of
four states: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.110 The
consolidated case, Obergefell v. Hodges, provided an opportunity for the
U.S. Supreme Court to define sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class
for the first time.111 The plaintiffs sought to answer the question of
whether the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required states to include same-sex couples
within the definition of marriage.112
Leading up to this landmark case, three competing theories existed as
to how the U.S. Supreme Court would handle the classification of sexual
orientation as a quasi-suspect class within the Equal Protection tiers of
scrutiny.113 The first theory suggested that the Court could have struck
down the same-sex marriage ban without declaring sexual orientation a

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Obergefell v. Hodges, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) (mem.); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772
F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
111. But cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to define
mental disability as a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis). The U.S. Supreme
Court “has extended suspect status to classifications based on national origin and alienage in addition
to those based on race.” Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90
YALE L.J. 912, 915 (1981). See id. Quasi-suspect status is afforded to “classifications based on
gender.” Suspect and quasi-suspect classifications trigger different levels of scrutiny. Id.
112. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 399.
113. Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1043, 1046 (2017).
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quasi-suspect class by solely relying on an animus theory.114 The animus
theory, which resides within rational basis review, is grounded within
demonstrated animus towards a “politically unpopular group.”115 The
second theory would have treated sexual orientation as a form of genderbased discrimination, thereby placing it within the intermediate tier of
scrutiny.116 The third theory relied on equating same-sex marriage to
anti-miscegenation laws, thus placing the analysis within the strict
scrutiny tier.117
In Obergefell, however, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case in a
manner that avoided the tiers of Equal Protection altogether. Instead, the
Court’s analysis rested on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
clause.118 The Court determined that marriage is a fundamental right held
within Due Process’s promise of liberty.119 Resting the decision on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause creates a narrow holding.120
“Because Obergefell was laser focused on the fundamental right to marry
and not the nature of the classification, . . . future courts can easily
distinguish Obergefell.”121 Even though Obergefell legalized same-sex
marriage in all fifty states, LGBT people are still left without the
protection of a suspect class.122 Without this protection, LGBT older
adults in federal and state funded long-term care facilities lack the ability
to fully challenge discrimination based upon their sexual orientation.
III. THE HURDLES IN CHALLENGING WITHDRAWN
PROPOSED RULES
This Part discusses judicial review of withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules and the lens through which courts review the agency’s
reasoning behind such withdrawals. It outlines the prevailing viewpoint
114. Id. at 1101.
115. Id. at 1058; see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s Amendment
2 to the state constitution prohibiting sexual orientation from inclusion in state antidiscrimination laws
under animus rationale).
116. Stearns, supra note 113, at 1101.
117. Id.
118. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
119. Id. at 2591.
120. Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 137, 142 (2015)
(“The Court’s failure to declare sexual orientation a suspect classification has resulted in concrete
harm to gays and lesbians . . . . [L]ower courts have repeatedly upheld laws discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation.”).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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of the D.C. Circuit—that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules are
judicially reviewable if certain conditions are fulfilled. This Part also
discusses the dissenting viewpoints to judicial review, primarily former
Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski’s criticism of the D.C. Circuit’s
approach. Specifically, Judge Kozinski finds that the D.C. Circuit’s
approach contravenes the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v.
Chaney.123 Lastly, this Part explains the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
review standard and how it applies to withdrawn discretionary proposed
rules.
A.

Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed Rules Are Reviewable If
Certain Criteria Are Satisfied

As previously discussed, there are three categories of withdrawn
proposed rules.124 Judicial review of the first two categories remains
unquestioned.125 However, the third category of withdrawn proposed rules
are creatures of agency discretion and provide a unique challenge to
judicial review for several reasons.126 First, this agency action is not
mandated or explicitly contemplated by the governing organic statute.127
Second, on its face, the text of the APA bars judicial review of
discretionary actions, unlike those that are required by statute.128 Lastly,
the U.S. Supreme Court has remained silent on the reviewability of
discretionary withdrawals. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that the APA should generally be read to cover a broad range
of agency action and that the judicial review sections should be read in a
“hospitable” manner.129
In the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court decision, the D.C. Circuit has
held that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules are nonetheless
reviewable.130 The D.C. Circuit’s precedent has sharply diverted from the
actual text of the APA, which states that actions reserved to an agency’s
discretion are not reviewable by the judicial branch.131

123. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
124. See supra Part I.
125. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1189–90; see supra section I.C.
126. Id. at 1190.
127. Id.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
129. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967), abrogated on other grounds, Califano
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
130. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
131. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).

17 - Carmody.docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

REVIEWING WITHDRAWN PROPOSED RULES

12/28/2018 4:31 PM

2123

The most extensive analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s view of withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules appears in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. SEC.132 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) withdrew “proposed disclosure rules” after a substantial noticeand-comment period, including “nineteen days of public hearings.”133 On
appeal, the SEC argued that the district court “erred because the SEC’s
decision not to adopt rules was nonreviewable.”134 The SEC relied
exclusively on section 701(a)(2) of the APA to make a textual argument
that discretionary actions by agencies are not reviewable.135 The D.C.
Circuit disagreed, rejecting the SEC’s argument and stating that
section 701(a)(2) “creates a strong presumption of reviewability that can
only be rebutted by a clear showing that judicial review would be
inappropriate.”136
Even though the D.C. Circuit held that section 701(a)(2) creates a
presumption of reviewability,137 the court of appeals refused to issue a per
se rule.138 Rather, the D.C. Circuit cautioned that review of withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules will not be proper in every case.139 Thus,
courts must balance an agency’s expertise with section 701(a)(2)’s
presumption of reviewability.140
In light of this balance, the D.C. Circuit created two procedural hurdles
that a withdrawal must satisfy for a reviewing court to determine if the
agency correctly withdrew the proposed rule.141 First, the withdrawal must
signal the completion of the agency’s regulatory process; the action must
represent the agency’s determination that it will not tinker with the
proposed issue further.142 The agency is often in the best position to
discern “internal management considerations as to budget and personnel;
evaluations of its own competence; weighing of competing policies within
a broad statutory framework.”143 Similarly, the agency is also the best
132. 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
133. Id. at 1037–39.
134. Id. at 1043.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1047.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1046–47.
141. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1192.
142. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 710 F.2d 842, 847–48 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
143. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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party to determine whether the timing is right to promulgate a new rule.144
Second, the reviewing court needs to assess a sufficient record
documenting the agency’s decision.145 Thus, in Natural Resources
Defense Council, review of the withdrawn proposed rule was proper
because the SEC held “extensive rulemaking proceedings narrowly
focused on the particular rules at issue, and [had] explained in detail its
reasons for not adopting those rules . . . .”146 In sum, the D.C. Circuit has
ultimately furnished an amorphous standard where review is proper if “the
agency has in fact held a rulemaking proceeding and compiled a record
narrowly focused on the particular rules suggested but not adopted.”147
Even if a withdrawal of a proposed rule is concrete and specific enough
to surpass the D.C. Circuit’s hurdles to review, the court of appeals will
give an immense amount of deference to the agency’s decision to
withdraw.148 Deference is given because “[t]he whole point of notice-andcomment rulemaking, after all, is that the comments which the agency
receives may induce it to abandon or modify its initial views.”149 Because
of the unique procedural posture of withdrawn discretionary proposed
rules, the D.C. Circuit will “give more deference to an agency’s decision
to withdraw a proposed rule than we give to its decision to promulgate a
new rule or to rescind an existing one.”150 However, an agency will not
receive unlimited deference because the notice of a proposed rule
“oblige[s] the agency to consider the comments it received and to
articulate a reasoned explanation for its decision.”151 Thus, the D.C.
Circuit has articulated the following standard: an agency cannot
“terminate . . . rulemaking for no reason whatsoever.”152
More recently, the Ninth Circuit appeared to be in lockstep with the
D.C. Circuit on the reviewability of withdrawn discretionary proposed
rules.153 In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Veneman,154 several animal
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1046–47.
146. Id. at 1047.
147. Id.
148. Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
149. Id. at 446.
150. United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also
Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d at 443–44.
151. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d. at 450.
152. Id. at 446.
153. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman (Veneman I), 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated
en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
154. 469 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
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welfare organizations sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
for its decision not to adopt a “Draft Policy” that would have provided
guidance to zoos, research facilities, and other similar entities for “how to
ensure the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates in order to
comply with the Animal Welfare Act (AWA).”155 The Draft Policy
remained a draft for three years until the USDA’s Deputy Administrator
for Animal Care announced that USDA was withdrawing the action.156
The plaintiffs challenged the decision to withdraw the Draft Policy as
arbitrary and capricious.157
Initially, the Ninth Circuit relied on the D.C. Circuit case, Natural
Resources Defense Council, to summarize the two-step process for
reviewing the withdrawal of proposed discretionary rules. First, “[t]he
agency must ‘have held a rulemaking proceeding.’”158 Second, the agency
“must have ‘compiled a record narrowly focused on the particular rules
suggested but not adopted.’”159 The Ninth Circuit determined that
USDA’s actions satisfied the two-step process and remanded the case
back to the district court to determine whether the decision to withdraw
was arbitrary and capricious.160 The Ninth Circuit’s decision, however,
was eventually overturned and vacated en banc.161
B.

The Reviewability of Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed Rules in
Light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Heckler v. Chaney

The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Natural Resources Defense Council
predates the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Heckler v. Chaney.
Heckler determined certain discretionary actions by an agency are
unreviewable.162 In Heckler, the respondents had been sentenced to death
“by lethal injection of drugs under the laws of the States of Oklahoma and
Texas.”163 Respondents argued that the specific lethal injection drugs had
not been approved for use on humans.164 Despite this contention, the FDA
refused to take “various investigatory and enforcement actions” to prevent
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 829.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 843 (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
Id.
Id. at 844.
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman (Veneman II), 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
Id. at 823.
Id.
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the perceived violations of the FDA.165 Therefore, the respondents filed
suit seeking to compel the FDA to undertake adjudicatory procedures.166
The Court acknowledged that section 701(a)(2) of the APA and case
precedent dictated a presumption of reviewability.167 However, that
presumption did not apply to an agency’s decision to pursue discretionary
enforcement actions.168
The Court stated that agencies, not the courts, are better equipped to
sift through the numerous variables associated with whether an agency
should pursue enforcement actions.169 This agency decision, the Court
held, “involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise.”170 Furthermore, the Court noted that when
an agency chooses not to pursue enforcement actions, “it generally does
not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property
rights.”171 However, when an agency chooses to act, “that action itself
provides a focus for judicial review.”172 Thus, the reviewing court is better
able to assess whether “the agency exceeded its statutory powers.”173 The
Court cautioned that discretionary enforcement action is only
presumptively unreviewable.174 Moreover, the Court also made it quite
clear that it was not deciding the reviewability of discretionary
rulemaking.175
Former Judge Alex Kozinski, in a recent Ninth Circuit opinion,176
dissented from the Veneman I majority’s decision to review the USDA’s
withdrawn Draft Policy.177 He argued vigorously in favor of the non-

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 830–31.
168. Id. at 831.
169. Id. at 831–32 (“Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but
whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to
succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall
policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all. An
agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with
enforcing.”).
170. Id. at 831.
171. Id. at 832.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 825 n.2, 831–32.
176. Veneman I, 469 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 490
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
177. Id.
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reviewable nature of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules because of
Heckler.178 He argued that Heckler rung in a new era of administrative law
in which courts should refrain from reviewing certain discretionary
agency actions.179 Judge Kozinski believed his colleagues were stretching
the bounds of reviewability under the APA: “[i]n holding that we can
review withdrawal of proposed regulations an agency had no duty to
adopt, my colleagues overlook the sea-change in administrative law
wrought by Heckler v. Chaney, which held that we have no authority to
review an agency’s discretionary decision not to act.”180
For Judge Kozinski, Heckler’s holding sweeps broadly. Even though
the holding in Heckler did not apply to agency rulemaking, Judge
Kozinski argues that the same sentiments should apply to regulations
regardless because they “implicate precisely the same concerns addressed
in [Heckler].”181 He warned that the Veneman I majority and the D.C.
Circuit’s approach discourages agencies from engaging in discretionary
rulemaking “lest they be stuck with them if they cannot convince a federal
court that the record supports abandonment.”182 This expansion, Judge
Kozinski argues, completely disregards U.S. Supreme Court precedent
and cannot stand.183
1.

Massachusetts v. EPA Highlights That Heckler v. Chaney Does
Not Apply to Every Discretionary Agency Action

As discussed above, the APA generally does not allow a court to review
discretionary agency action.184 Furthermore, in Heckler, the U.S. Supreme
Court made it clear that an agency’s decision not to bring enforcement
action is presumptively unreviewable.185 In its 2007 decision,
Massachusetts v. EPA,186 the Court addressed judicial review of agency
inaction again.187 This case, however, presented a different regulatory
posture; the Court was tasked with reviewing the EPA’s denial of a

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 849.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 853.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 511.
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petition for rulemaking.188 In deciding the case, the Court answered two
questions: (1) “whether EPA has the statutory authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions,”189 and (2) “whether its stated reasons for
refusing to do so are consistent with the statute.”190
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a petition for
rulemaking with the EPA.191 The organizations asked the EPA to regulate
“greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under § 202 of the
Clean Air Act.”192 Fifteen months after the request, the EPA opened
public comment for all issues relating to the organizations’ petition.193
Over the next five months, the EPA received over 50,000 comments
relating to the petition.194 In 2003, the EPA entered an order denying the
petition for rulemaking.195 In denying the petition for rulemaking, the EPA
stated that the “Clean Air Act does not authorize [the] EPA to issue
mandatory regulations to address global climate change” and “that even
if the Agency had the authority . . . it would be unwise to do so at this
time.”196
After a lengthy discussion of standing, the Court noted that “an agency
has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources
and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities.”197 The Court
referenced its decision in Heckler to affirm the notion that agency
“discretion is at its height when [it] decides not to bring an enforcement
action.”198 The Court noted, however, that there are “key differences”
between an agency denial of a petition for rulemaking and a denial of
enforcement,199 and thus refused to extend Heckler’s presumption of
unreviewability.200 Even though the Court did not extend Heckler, it
limited Heckler’s holding and noted that review of petition denials would

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 510.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 511.
194. Id.; see Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,924 (denied petition for rulemaking Sept. 8, 2003).
195. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 527.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies
Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 173 (2014).
200. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527–28.
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be “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.”201 The Court found that
judicial review of denials of petitions for rulemaking “are less frequent,
more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject to
special formalities, including a public explanation.”202
The Court ultimately held that the EPA’s reasoning for denying the
petition for rulemaking could not stand.203 The Court determined that the
Clean Air Act did in fact contemplate the regulation of greenhouse
gases.204 The EPA argued various reasons why regulation was not proper,
but for the Court, those reasons missed the mark.205 For example, the EPA
noted that the regulation “might impair the President’s ability to negotiate
with ‘key developing nations’ to reduce emissions,” and that regulating
greenhouse gas emissions would be “inefficient” and “piecemeal.”206
The Court found that EPA’s reasons did not support its decision to deny
the petition for rulemaking.207 The EPA could not avoid statutory
obligations “by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of
climate change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to
regulate at this time.”208 The Court stated that if the “scientific uncertainty
[was] so profound that it precludes [the] EPA from making a reasoned
judgment . . . [the] EPA must say so.”209
C.

An Agency Must Satisfy the APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious
Standard in Order to Successfully Withdraw a Proposed Rule

If a withdrawn discretionary proposed rule satisfies the D.C. Circuit’s
two-step reviewability standard, a court will review the agency’s
reasoning under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review standard.210
To survive arbitrary and capricious review, the agency’s reasoning must
be sufficiently definite because it provides the only window into the
agency’s decision to withdraw the rule.211 The U.S. Supreme Court used

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. at 527 (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 534.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 534.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added); see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
See Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 196.
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this standard to review the EPA’s reasoning in Massachusetts v. EPA.212
The following sections describe the boundaries of the arbitrary and
capricious review standard and what is required of an agency to
adequately withdraw a proposed rule.
1.

The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and Judicial Review of
Agency Action

The APA requires courts to set aside “agency action, findings, and
conclusions” if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with [the] law.”213 The landmark decision
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co.214 established certain guidelines for the arbitrary and
capricious standard. In State Farm, the Court reviewed the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration decision to rescind a Department
of Transportation requirement “that new motor vehicles produced after
September 1982 be equipped with passive restraints to protect the safety
of the [passengers].”215 The Court reviewed the agency’s decision under
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.216
Arbitrary and capricious review is a relatively narrow and limited
judicial tool because reviewing courts cannot substitute their own
judgment for an agency’s decision.217 Consequently, courts are
constrained to reviewing only the agency record or the agency’s
reasoning.218 This limited review prevents agencies from constructing
post-hoc rationalizations to explain its decisions.219 Moreover, in
providing an adequate reason, an “agency must examine the relevant data
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”220 The agency
must rely on “relevant factors”221 and the court will consider if the agency

212. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534.
213. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
214. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
215. Id. at 34.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 43; Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971).
218. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
219. Id.
220. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962)).
221. Id.
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has made a “clear error in judgement.”222 Typically an agency decision
will be arbitrary and capricious if it:
[R]elied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation . . . that runs counter to
the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.223
Arbitrary and capricious review is often referred to as a “hard look”224
that relies on “statutory, factual, scientific, or otherwise technocratic
terms.”225 The back and forth of politics “cannot properly help to explain
administrative action for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review.”226
Even if politics play a role in the background of an agency’s motivation
for action and reasoning, arbitrary and capricious review commands an
agency to explain its reasoning in technocratic and factual terms.227
2.

The Application of Arbitrary and Capricious Review to Withdrawn
Discretionary Proposed Rules

The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stated that it will review withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules through an extremely deferential lens, even
more so than it would for other agency actions, such as the “promulgation
of . . . new rule[s].”228 The D.C. Circuit applies such a deferential standard
because withdrawn discretionary proposed rules do not alter the
“regulatory status quo.”229 In contrast, when an agency promulgates a new
rule, however, it should receive a more exacting review.230 Thus, an
agency must give “a more persuasive justification” for promulgating new
rules “than [it] does [for] the decision to retain an existing rule.”231
The D.C. Circuit has made it clear that it is not advocating for a
different standard of arbitrary and capricious review in regards to
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119
YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009).
225. Id. at 2.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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withdrawals of discretionary proposed rules.232 The court “simply note[s]
that [its] application of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard must be
informed by our recognition that an agency’s decision to retain the status
quo may be more easily defensible than a shift in policy would be.”233 In
sum, the D.C. Circuit relies on the APA’s arbitrary and capricious
standard to guide review of an agency’s reasons for a withdrawal, but it
will also give an extra deferential nod to the agency’s decision.234
In 2004, the D.C. Circuit directly addressed its current view of the
arbitrary and capricious review standard for withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules.235 In United Mine Workers v. U.S. Department of
Labor,236 the D.C. Circuit held that the Mine Safety and Health
Administration’s (MSHA) decision to withdraw a proposed rule was
arbitrary and capricious.237 The 1989 proposed rule would have
established certain permissible exposure limits “for more than 600
chemical substances that might be present in a mine.”238 After the noticeand-comment period, which included several public hearings, MSHA
withdrew the proposed rule.239 In withdrawing the rule, MSHA reasoned
that “changes in agency priorities” along with “the possible adverse
effect . . . of the decision in AFL-CIO v. OSHA, in which the Eleventh
Circuit had invalidated an [Occupational Safety and Health
Administration] rule that set new [permissible exposure limits] for 428
toxic substances” ultimately made the proposed rule useless.240 MSHA
also indicated that it had been “more than 13 years since the proposal was
published and more than 12 years since the comments were received.”241
The agency gave three potential reasons for the D.C. Circuit to review,
none of which passed arbitrary and capricious review.242 The D.C. Circuit
held that merely stating a “change in agency priorities” does not and
cannot guide a reviewing court because it is “merely a reiteration of the

232. Id. at 444.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 443.
235. United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
236. 358 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 41.
239. Id. at 42.
240. Id.; Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 986–87 (11th Cir.
1992).
241. United Mine Workers, 358 F.3d at 42 (quoting Air Quality Chemical Substances and
Respiratory Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,611, 60,611 (Sept. 26, 2002)).
242. Id. at 44.
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decision to withdraw the proposed rule.”243 The amount of time that
passed between proposing the rule and the withdrawal is a reason to
hesitate before promulgating, but “not for abandoning altogether.”244
Lastly, MSHA gave no explanation for why AFL-CIO v. OSHA245 was
“fatal” to the proposed rule.246 Thus, the D.C. Circuit sent it back to the
agency to “either proceed with the . . . rulemaking or give a reasoned
account of its decision not to do so.”247
IV. WITHDRAWN DISCRETIONARY PROPOSED RULES
SHOULD BE REVIEWABLE UNDER THE APA’S
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
In sum, even though the 2014 proposed CMS rule may not have added
sweeping protections for LGBT older adults in long-term care facilities,
the subsequent withdrawal of the proposed rule by the Trump
Administration highlights an uncertain and evolving area of
administrative law. The proposed CMS rule falls into the third category
of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules—representing both agency
action and inaction. The proposed CMS rule also highlights how, even
after considerable resources are expended for a rule proposal, agencies
can summarily withdraw the proposed rule with little explanation.
Furthermore, whether judicial review of an agency’s reasoning for a
withdrawal is proper remains on uncertain ground.
The uncertainty surrounding judicial review of withdrawn proposed
agency rules stems from the U.S. Supreme Court’s silence. The D.C.
Circuit, however, has held that withdrawn proposed rules are reviewable
if certain requirements are met.248 Beyond the D.C. Circuit, some judges
argue that reviewing withdrawn discretionary proposed rules contravenes
Heckler v. Chaney,249 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts
cannot review an agency’s discretionary non-enforcement decision.250
If, however, a withdrawn discretionary proposed rule fulfills the D.C.
Circuit’s reviewability requirements, the court of appeals utilizes the
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
246. United Mine Workers, 358 F.3d at 44.
247. Id. at 45.
248. Id. at 43–44; Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
249. Veneman I, 469 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 490
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
250. 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
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APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, unless the organic act specifies
otherwise.251 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stated that
withdrawn discretionary proposed rules receive enhanced deference, but
not an expanded arbitrary and capricious review.252 Thus, the D.C. Circuit
will give more deference to an agency’s decision to withdraw a proposed
rule than it would give to an agency’s decision to promulgate a rule.253
A.

The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Is the Appropriate Judicial
Review Mechanism to Review Withdrawn Discretionary Proposed
Rules

A withdrawn discretionary proposed rule properly before a court
contains all the necessary pieces for arbitrary and capricious review. The
D.C. Circuit’s threshold question for reviewability simply asks whether
the APA’s process of informal rulemaking has been implemented and to
what extent.254 A withdrawn proposed rule may signal final agency action,
and through notice-and-comment rulemaking, an agency has likely
created an extensive enough record for a reviewing court to adequately
assess an agency’s reasoning.255 Thus, the holding in Heckler v. Chaney
should not extend to withdrawn discretionary proposed rules because,
unlike an agency’s decision not to enforce, a withdrawn proposed rule
contains an adequate record to assess the agency’s reasoning.
Judge Kozinski, however, argues the opposite—Heckler forecloses
judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules.256
Furthermore, Judge Kozinski argues that the D.C. Circuit’s precedent will
have a chilling effect on informal rulemaking.257 Under his view, agencies
hesitate before launching into the informal rulemaking process as to avoid
ending up with a discretionary rule that they no longer need or want.258

251. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (2012); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
252. Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443–44 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
253. Id.
254. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that review
of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules is proper when “the agency has in fact held extensive
rulemaking proceedings narrowly focused on the particular rules at issue, and has explained in detail
its reasons for not adopting those rules”).
255. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d at 443.
256. Veneman I, 469 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 490
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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While Judge Kozinski correctly highlights that informal rulemaking
involves varying levels of discretion and expertise, the informal
rulemaking process and the abandonment thereof provides sufficient
bounds and specificity for judicial review. Informal notice-and-comment
rulemaking contains several procedural boundaries to ensure the creation
of an adequate record.259 Discretion in agency enforcement, such as when
or how to enforce, does not contain similar bounds,260 thus making review
more difficult and inaccurate.
The Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA further supports the
reviewability of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules, even though the
case was grounded in a different type of agency action. Withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules have more procedural backing within the
APA than what is required for a denial of a petition for rulemaking. 261
Notice-and-comment rulemaking ensures a specific process from which
agencies are not allowed to deviate.262 For example, an agency must
publish a “statement of their basis and purpose” for every proposed rule,
thus when an agency decides to formally withdrawal such a rule, the
agency must provide a reason that satisfies the arbitrary and capricious
standard.263 Withdrawing proposed rules involves significant agency
discretion, but it also involves a highly standardized process that includes
the creation of a detailed record. Judicial review of these withdrawals
ensures that agencies are not abusing the significant discretion allotted to
them by Congress.
B.

Arbitrary and Capricious Review Ensures Reasoned and Measured
Agency Decision-Making

Arbitrary and capricious review requires an agency to provide adequate
reasoning for agency action. The standard requires a logical connection
between the rationale and the action itself.264 This highly deferential
standard is a relatively low bar, as the standard recognizes that agency
discretion is often rooted in agency expertise and it is not appropriate for
courts to usurp an agency’s reasoned decision.265 Thus, arbitrary and
capricious review ensures a minimum standard of reasoned
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830–31 (1985).
Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c), with 5 U.S.C § 553(e).
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3); Beerman & Lawson, supra note 40, at 856.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
See id.

16 - Carmody (Do Not Delete)

2136

12/28/2018 4:31 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:2107

decision-making in two ways. First, arbitrary and capricious review forces
agencies to provide adequate reasons to support their decisions.266 Second,
arbitrary and capricious review ensures that reviewing courts have an
adequate record to review an agency’s reason and that the record logically
connects to the agency’s decision.267 U.S. Supreme Court precedent has
firmly established that a reviewing court can assess only what was
provided in the record.268 This precedent securely tethers arbitrary and
capricious review as a manageable standard.269
Judge Kozinski’s concerns with unfettered judicial review of agency
discretion are cured through the D.C. Circuit’s already highly deferential
standard given to agencies when withdrawing a proposed rule. The D.C.
Circuit has repeatedly stated that it will give more deference in reviewing
withdrawn discretionary proposed rules than it would accord to a final
promulgation of a rule, while not expanding the arbitrary and capricious
review standard.270
For example, the withdrawn proposed CMS rule would likely survive
arbitrary and capricious review if challenged. CMS stated that there was
no longer a need for the proposed rule due to the holding in Obergefell.271
Like the court in United Mine Workers of America, a reviewing court
would assess whether CMS adequately explained why Obergefell moots
the need for the proposed rule.272 In the published withdrawal, CMS noted
that Obergefell “requires a state to license a marriage between two people
of the same sex, and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed

266. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1947) (requiring agencies to provide a reason for
their actions so that courts are adequately prepared to review such decisions and finding that a court
cannot supplement its own judgement for what the agency did).
267. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971) (remanding
because the lower court did not adequately review the full administrative record).
268. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. at 94.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“In
applying this standard, we give more deference to an agency’s decision to withdraw a proposed rule
than we give to its decision to promulgate a new rule or to rescind an existing one.”); Williams Nat.
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“At the same time,
however, we believe that the agency’s termination of a rulemaking should be reviewed somewhat
more deferentially than would its promulgation of a new rule.”); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC,
606 F.2d 1031, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Thus, the considerations that counsel against judicial review
of a decision not to adopt rules by informal rulemaking also call for us, when we do review, to exercise
special deference.”).
271. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,181, 46,181 (withdrawn Oct.
4, 2017).
272. United Mine Workers, 358 F.3d at 44.
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in other States.”273 It is true that Obergefell requires states to recognize all
lawfully performed same-sex marriages, thus the withdrawal likely
survives the already deferential arbitrary and capricious review standard.
The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly stated that it will use arbitrary and
capricious review, but it has also established the agency cannot
“terminate . . . rulemaking for no reason whatsoever.”274
Judicial review of withdrawn discretionary proposed rules simply
ensures that agencies are not abandoning the rulemaking process for
completely arbitrary reasons. Thus, arbitrary and capricious review serves
as a perfectly adequate tool to compel reasoned decision-making in
withdrawing a proposed rule. Furthermore, the bulk of withdrawn
discretionary proposed rules are likely to come at times when political
interests may serve as the true motivating force for action.275 Therefore,
this standard guarantees that agencies are not abusing their discretionary
power and withdrawing proposed rules for arbitrary reasons.
CONCLUSION
The 2017 withdrawal of an Obama Administration proposed rule
highlights an unsettled area of administrative law. The proposed CMS rule
attempted to provide legal protection for same-sex spouses in the wake of
the Windsor decision. However, even though the CMS rule garnered
ninety-four comments over the course of three years, the agency
ultimately decided to withdraw it. In its withdrawal reasoning, CMS stated
that the Obergefell decision provided what the rule sought to achieve,
therefore the rule was unnecessary.
This Comment argues that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules
should be subject to judicial review. In reviewing withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules, the D.C. Circuit examines an agency’s reasoning under
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit
has repeatedly stated that it will give enhanced deference to withdrawn
rules than if the agency promulgated a new rule or rescinded an old rule.
Outside the D.C. Circuit, the reviewability of withdrawn discretionary
proposed rules is less certain. Former Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski argues
that withdrawn discretionary proposed rules should not be reviewable
because of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Heckler. However,
informal rulemaking initiates a different mechanism under the APA,
which provides adequate structures and procedures for the creation of an
273. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Certain Patient’s Rights Conditions for
Participation and Conditions for Coverage; Withdrawal, 82 Fed. Reg. at 46,181.
274. Williams Nat. Gas Co., 872 F.2d at 450.
275. See Watts, supra note 224, at 70–71.
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administrative record. Withdrawn discretionary proposed rules should be
reviewable under the APA because the arbitrary and capricious standard
ensures reasoned agency decision-making and prevents abuse of power.

